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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LAWRENCE HENRY GRIZZARD,
Defendant-Appellant.
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NO. 46198-2018
TWIN FALLS COUNTY NO. CR-2013-5996

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Lawrence Grizzard contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence in his case. Specifically, he asserts the district court failed to give sufficient
consideration to the mitigating factors in his case.

As such, this Court should reduce

Mr. Grizzard’s sentence as it deems appropriate or, alternatively, remand this case for a new
sentencing hearing in the district court.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Without the benefit of a plea agreement, Mr. Grizzard decided to plead guilty to the
charge of robbery in this case. (R., p.86; Tr., Vol.1, p.3, L.25 - p.4, L.2.)1 He also apologized to
the teller from whom he had taken the money for the effects his actions had on her. (Tr., Vol.2,
p.21, Ls.5-9; Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.5-6.)
The PSI author noted that Mr. Grizzard had been passing through Idaho on his way home
to South Carolina when the incident occurred. (PSI, p.11.) Mr. Grizzard was subsequently
arrested in South Carolina and the Idaho warrant served on him there.

(R., pp.124-25.)

However, he spent several years incarcerated in South Carolina due to an unrelated charge there
before he was transferred to Idaho. (See R., pp.31, 39; see also R., pp.120-25 & Aug. p.2
(showing that Mr. Grizzard was entitled to credit in this case for that period of incarceration).)2
During his time incarcerated in South Carolina, Mr. Grizzard participated in several
programs and also earned his GED. (Tr., Vol.2, p.18, L.21 - p.19, L.3.) One of his instructors
wrote a letter of support, explaining that “While in the WorkKeys program, Mr. Grizzard
attended class daily and worked diligently to improve his work readiness skills. Mr. Grizzard
earned a Gold WorkKeys certificate.” (PSI, p.29.) His instructor concluded: “It is my belief
that Mr. Grizzard is making an effort to better himself during his incarceration by participating
and completing the WorkKeys program.” (PSI, p.29.) Defense counsel added that, as a result of
his efforts, Mr. Grizzard hard earned the opportunity for parole in his South Carolina case.
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The transcripts in this case were provided in two separately bound and paginated volumes. To
avoid confusion, “Vol.1” will refer to the volume containing the transcript of the April 3, 2018,
change of plea hearing, and “Vol.2” will refer to the volume containing the transcript of the June
18, 2018, sentencing hearing.
2
A motion to augment the record with the order granting credit for time served has been filed
contemporaneously with this brief.
2

(Tr., Vol.2, p.18, Ls.8-15.)

As such, defense counsel asked the district court to impose a

sentence with a small fixed term. 3 (Tr., p.20, Ls.17-18.)
The district court acknowledged Mr. Grizzard’s efforts at rehabilitation while
incarcerated in South Carolina, but felt a question still remained regarding “[h]ow much of a
change has occurred as a result of that incarceration?” (Tr., Vol.2, p.23, Ls.8-9.) Weighing that
against Mr. Grizzard’s criminal history, the district court concluded two things:

that

rehabilitation was not going to be likely through a period of probation, and that, as a result,
rehabilitation would not be the primary factor in crafting the sentence in this case. (Tr., Vol.2,
p.23, Ls.10-15.) As such, the district court imposed a unified sentence of twenty-one years, with
six years fixed. (Tr., Vol.2, p.23, Ls.22-24; R., p.106.)4 Mr. Grizzard filed a notice of appeal
timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.113-15.)

3

There was some confusion at the change of plea hearing as to what the statute requires in a
robbery sentence. (Tr., Vol.1, p.8, L.8 - p.9, L.2.) Specifically, I.C. § 18-6503 requires a
sentence be at least five years long, but it does not require those five years to be determinate, nor
does it prevent the district court from suspending execution of that sentence. State v. Ramsey,
159 Idaho 635, 637 (Ct. App. 2015) (“Thus, any period of confinement, determinate or
indeterminate, for a term between five years and life, will be consistent with Section 18-6503”);
see State v. Olivas, 158 Idaho 375, 380-81 (2015) (discussing the district court’s continuing
ability to suspend a sentence in relation to Article V, section 13 and mandatory minimum
sentences).
4
There is a typographical error in the transcript in regard to the fixed term of Mr. Grizzard’s
sentence, as it says: “I sentence the -- the defendant to a unified term of 21 years, consisting of a
60 year [as opposed to a 6 year] fixed term and a 15-year indeterminate term.” (Tr., Vol.2, p.23,
Ls.22-24.) That the fixed term was to be for 6 years is evident from the context, as a 21-year
sentence with a 15-year indeterminate would mathematically have a 6-year fixed term. (Accord
R., p.106 (judgment of conviction reiterating the sentence with a 6-year fixed term).)
3

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence on
Mr. Grizzard.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence On Mr. Grizzard
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the
public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982). Accordingly, in order
to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentencing decision, he must show that, in
light of the governing criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. State
v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997); see Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64
(2018) (articulating the standard for reviewing whether the district court abused its discretion).
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are:

(1) protection of society;

(2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and
(4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).
The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider.

State v.

Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). The Idaho Supreme Court has also indicated that
rehabilitation is the first means the district court should consider to achieve that goal. See
State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in State v.
Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).
In this case, the district court failed to sufficiently consider the mitigating factors, and as
such, it did not reach its decision in an exercise of reason. Notably, Mr. Grizzard accepted
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responsibility for his actions by pleading guilty to the charged offense without the benefit of a
plea agreement and apologizing to the victim for the effects his actions had on her.
Acknowledgment of guilt and acceptance of responsibility by the defendant are critical first steps
in the rehabilitation process. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010).
However, by completing, with distinction, the classes offered during his incarceration in
South Carolina, Mr. Grizzard affirmatively demonstrated that he has taken far more than just the
first steps toward rehabilitation. Moreover, it is this documented progress toward rehabilitation
which reveals that the district court’s reliance on Mr. Grizzard’s criminal history to justify the
sentence imposed went beyond what was reasonable.
The reason that sentencing courts can consider criminal history at sentencing is that
criminal history is one of several predictors of future conduct. However, when there is other
information which shows that the characteristics which led to that criminal history have been
corrected or otherwise accounted for, the reliability of criminal history as a predictor of future
behavior is severely reduced. That is, after all, the point of a department of corrections – to
rehabilitate a person, to help a person change their character, to the point that he can overcome
his prior criminal tendencies and rejoin society. E.g., State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639
(Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that sentences are to be crafted so that they do not “rigidly forc[e]
them [correctional authorities] to hold him in prison long after the rehabilitative process . . . may
have ameliorated risk of recidivism”). In other words, sentencing a person based on who they
were in the past, rather than on who they are now, is unreasonable.
That Mr. Grizzard falls into this category of people who have addressed the issues behind
their prior criminal behavior and are ready to rejoin society as a result of their rehabilitative
efforts is actually clear from the fact that South Carolina determined he was eligible to rejoin
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society on parole.

(See Tr., Vol.2, p.18, Ls.8-15.)

As such, the district court abused its

discretion by basing its sentencing decision primarily on Mr. Grizzard’s criminal history, since
the facts in this record demonstrate that his criminal history is no longer a reliable predictor of
his future behavior. That improper focus actually impacted the district court’s ability to properly
evaluate the goals of sentencing, most notably the primary goal of whether incarceration is
necessary to protect society. See, e.g., I.C. § 19-2521(1) (providing that the district court should
not imprison a person unless “it is of the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for protection
of the public”). As such, the district court abused its discretion by not reaching its sentencing
decision in an exercise of reason.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Grizzard respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 7th day of January, 2019.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7th day of January, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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